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Foreign Investment Restrictions as Industrial Policy:
The Case of Canadian Telecommunications 
Robert W. Crandall† and Hal J. Singer‡
We assess the economic harms that would accrue if to develop across different platforms — cable, wireline,
Canada were to adopt asymmetric rules of foreign own- and wireless — not among small niche players lured into
ership for incumbent carriers and entrants. We explain the marketplace by regulators.
the current Canadian regulatory climate surrounding
With the lessons of the U.S. regulatory experience inforeign investment in Canadian telecommunications.
mind, we review two specific Canadian proposalsCompetition in the telecommunications industry is gen-
regarding foreign investment rules: tiering and licensing.erally robust, which suggests that rules aimed at
We conclude that a tiering approach would harm com-favouring entrants are not necessary. Moreover, Cana-
petition and infrastructure investment because it woulddian entrants are equally capable of attracting foreign
reduce the incentives of incumbent carriers to invest incapital as Canadian incumbents, which suggests that for-
network upgrades or new services, and potentially aggra-eign investment rules aimed at favouring entrants are
vate the problem of excess capacity that plagues theespecially unwise.
telecommunications industry. A licensing approach for
Next, we review the U.S. attempt to stimulate com- foreign investment restrictions should also be rejected.
petition in local telecommunications markets through Licensing would impose a further layer of regulation on
an analogous form of asymmetrical regulation. Despite the marketplace, reduce foreign investment, and expose
the best of intentions, United States regulators have not foreign carriers to political pressures. The Canadian
been able to stimulate meaningful local competition agencies should not follow their southern neighbours
through such asymmetrical regulation. Moreover, the down the road to despair.
resultant easy access to capital created wasteful invest-
ment by the entrants. Second, licensing restrictions on
foreign carriers in the U.S. reflect another form of asym-
metric regulation because they apply only to wireless I. Introduction licenses, not wireline operations. This licensing process
confers substantial discretionary authority on the FCC,
ndustry Canada has proposed a re-examination ofwhich has allowed the process to become highly I Canada’s foreign investment restrictions that apply topoliticized. Finally, asymmetric rules for broadband ser-
the telecommunications sector because it fears that thesevices have cemented the position of cable modem prov-
restrictions are leading to under-investment in the Cana-iders vis-à-vis DSL providers.
dian telecommunications sector. 1 Industry Canada has
The U.S. experience highlights several issues that thus issued a number of questions to establish a dialogue
may be relevant for Industry Canada as it assesses the about alternatives to the current foreign investment
effect of changes in foreign ownership rules on competi- restrictions. Among the alternatives being considered are
tion in telecommunications. In particular, the invest- proposals to relax these investment restrictions for new
ment of more than $40 billion by entrants in the U.S. entrants or for smaller companies, while leaving the
local telecommunications markets has been almost com- restrictions in place for the established incumbent car-
pletely squandered. This asymmetric regulation did not riers. 2 As an alternative or complementary policy, it is
succeed in attracting entrants that would have a measur- examining the possibility of a new licensing regime for
able effect on the retail price of telecommunications foreign investment in telecommunications that would
services. Given the nature of demand for and supply of allow the government to decide on the admissibility of
telecommunications services, competition is more likely foreign capital on a case-by-case basis. 3
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Canada thus proposes two types of asymmetric reg- In Part II of this article, we explain the current Cana-
ulation: one in which firms are regulated differently, and dian regulatory climate surrounding foreign investment
another in which investors are regulated differently. in Canadian telecommunications. We also describe the
There is no clear academic consensus on the merits of state of competition and foreign investment in Canadian
either form of asymmetric regulation. A number of telecommunications. Competition in the telecommuni-
authors have suggested that asymmetric regulation by cations industry is robust, which suggests that rules
firm type fosters growth in the telecommunications aimed at favouring entrants in general might not be
industry. Thomas Kiessling and Yves Blondeel assert that necessary. Moreover, Canadian entrants are equally
asymmetric regulation of incumbents can lead to net capable of attracting foreign capital as Canadian incum-
efficiency gains by countering the structural market bents, which suggests that foreign investment rules
advantages of those incumbents, provided that entrants aimed at favouring entrants are especially unwise.
are facilities-based. 4 Yuntsai Chou and Kung-Chung Liu In Part III of this article, we describe privilegedargue that the asymmetric regulation of carriers based on classes of carriers identified by the U.S. Federal Commu-incumbency and platform in Taiwan played a large role nications Commission (FCC) in local exchange (compet-in the more than ten-fold increase in Taiwan’s mobile itive carriers), wireless services (designated entities),penetration rate between 1997 and 2000. 5 Numerous broadband Internet access (cable modem providers), andauthors, however, point out that there is a large danger international telecommunications (wireline providers).that asymmetric regulation will distort the competitive We examine the nature of the asymmetric regulation inenvironment. 6 each of those sectors and provide a qualitative analysis of
Academic opinion of the asymmetric regulation of the cost of skewing the regulatory landscape.
foreign investment tends to be somewhat more resolute.
In Part IV, we apply the lessons of the U.S. experi-Woo-Sik Moon and Yeong-Seop Rhee argue that the
ence to the Canadian situation. The proposals advancedasymmetric regulation of capital flows in Korea was one
by Industry Canada would place restrictions on a selectof the ‘‘most important policy mistakes that caused the
group of participants in the telecommunications market-accumulation of external and internal vulnerability and
place. In predominantly privatized markets such astriggered the currency crisis’’. 7 Carsten Fink, Aaditya
Canadian telecommunications, such a tiered approachMattoo, and Randeep Rathindran argue that ‘‘it is not
presents several problems. Such an approach wouldeasy to find a sound rationale’’ for the existence of for-
reduce the incentives for incumbent carriers to invest ineign ownership requirements, but observe that there is
new facilities; if shareholders perceived that the restrictednot a sufficient analytical or empirical foundation for the
companies were at a competitive disadvantage, tieringevaluation of the costs and benefits of ownership restric-
could lower the restricted companies’ share prices, andtions. 8 In this paper, we aim to provide such a founda-
therefore, actually increase the cost of capital. Tieringtion, as it applies to actions proposed by Industry
would also risk replicating the problem of excessCanada, through an examination of the U.S. experience
capacity that now plagues the U.S. telecommunicationswith asymmetric regulation.
industry. Moreover, because Canada’s facilities-based car-To the extent that Industry Canada’s current con- riers differ in several dimensions, such as revenue,cerns about the lack of investment in Canadian telecom- market capitalization, and the technology used, tieringmunications are derived from a comparison of U.S. and would be difficult to implement. Licensing is equallyCanadian capital expenditures in this sector since the flawed because it would create new uncertainty for car-passage of the U.S. Telecommunications Act, those con- riers, which would likely reduce investment in Canada’scerns are misplaced. 9 It is now apparent that much of the telecommunications network. If licensing were condi-U.S. capital spending near the end of the last decade was tioned on, for instance, a head office in Canada or invest-driven by a speculative bubble, and that billions of dol- ment of a certain amount each year in rural broadbandlars were wasted on ill-advised new entry into local tele- deployment, then foreign investors would look for alter-communications and capacity expansion in transmis- native (non-Canadian) investment outlets.sion. Most of the carriers who made these investments
are now either bankrupt or in serious financial difficulty. The form of asymmetric regulation of foreign
Industry Canada should not induce entry from a larger investment contemplated by Industry Canada has failed
number of participants than the demand for telecom- to achieve its purported objectives in the United States,
munications services is capable of sustaining. It is better Australia, or Korea. Extending preferences to a particular
to leave these fundamental choices to the market. In this class of competitors is not likely to alter the long-term
article, we show that attempting to guide economic equilibrium market structure if those companies are not
resources to favoured groups of companies, whether by viable. The factors that influence that equilibrium —
relaxing foreign capital restrictions or by other regulatory economies of scale and scope, demographics, and market
programs, is a serious mistake that results in substantial technologies — are likely to be much more important
waste. than differential access to foreign capital in relatively
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large, wealthy countries, such as Canada. The persistent dential telecommunications services are lower than the
failure of policies in other countries that have targeted corresponding averages in the United States and
certain classes of competitors should serve as a warning OECD.15
to Canada as it contemplates making foreign capital All telecommunications sectors in the Canadian
more readily available to new entrants. economy are open to competition. Although new
entrants account for a smaller share of access lines in
Canada than in the United States, competition for the
II. Foreign Investment in Canadian local market in Canada is gaining strength. The Cana-
dian Radio-television and Telecommunications Com-Telecommunications 
mission (CRTC) is an independent regulator, whose poli-
oreign investment in Canadian telecommunications cies to date have created an effective regulatoryF carriers is currently restricted. Foreign ownership in environment. The OECD has praised Canada for
a holding company that owns telecommunications oper- ‘‘having a relatively better regulatory process’’ than many
ations is not permitted to exceed 46.7 per cent. 10 The other OECD countries, particularly as it relates to the
restriction applies equally to incumbents and new interface between incumbents and competitors. 16
entrants, and it is among the most stringent of all Organ-
Because it does not create artificial incentives forization of Economic Co-operation and Development
resale, Canada’s competition model encourages sustain-(OECD) countries. Canada’s Standing Committee on
able facilities-based competition. There exists inter-plat-Industry, Science and Technology recommended that
form competition between wireline, cable, and wirelessthe Government of Canada ‘‘entirely remove the existing
technologies. Competition in Canadian data and privateminimum Canadian ownership requirements’’. 11 In a
line services has earned those sectors of the Canadianletter to Walt Lastewka, Chair of the Standing Com-
telecommunications industry significant regulatory for-mittee on Industry, Science and Technology, Minister of
bearance. Similarly, competition among facilities-basedIndustry Allan Rock agreed with the Committee’s sug-
long distance carriers has led to lower prices and hasgestion to pursue the removal of foreign ownership
freed incumbents of rate regulation. Telus and Bellrestrictions in a symmetric manner:
Canada, the large incumbent local carriers in BC–AlbertaYou concluded that symmetrical removal of restrictions for
and Ontario–Quebec, respectively, are expending con-telecommunications carriers and BDUs, which compete
with similar services in the same markets, is the best way of siderable resources to enter one another’s geographical
achieving the objectives of both the Telecommunications markets with services aimed predominantly at business
Act and the Broadcasting Act. The government accepts this customers. To be fair, two of Canada’s five national net-
reasoning, which reinforces that in order to promote com- work providers were reorganizing under bankruptcypetition and regulate the industry in a smart, stable and
protection as of April 2003, but those carriers quicklyefficient manner, it would be irresponsible to move asym-
metrically. 12 emerged from such protection over the next few
months. The bankruptcies highlight the delicate tradeoffIn this article, we explain that the attitude towards
that regulators face between intense competition andasymmetric regulation expressed by Minister Rock is the
long-term industry stability.correct one. 13 Although it appears that Canada will chart
the correct course with respect to asymmetric regulation, Finally, intra- and inter-platform competition
the possibility of asymmetric regulation has not yet been between companies offering cable and digital subscriber
fully laid to rest. Our examination of the shortcomings of line (DSL) has fostered growth in high-speed data access
asymmetric regulation in the United States is intended market. Indeed, as of the end of 2002, Canada’s business
as a cautionary lesson against reversing course and broadband penetration was second only to Korea among
imposing asymmetric foreign investment regulations on OECD nations, and 85 per cent of Canadians lived in
incumbents and entrants. communities with access to high-speed broadband ser-
vice. 17
The State of Competition in Canadian The provision of local services in Canada offers no
Telecommunications exception to the competitive successes found elsewhere
Telecommunications competition is developing in the Canadian telecommunications industry. The
steadily under the present system of symmetric foreign CRTC has taken particular pains to enhance entrants’
investment rules. Canada’s commitment to telecommu- prospects for success by mandating number portability,
nications has resulted in a secure infrastructure, afford- unbundled local loops, co-location, and interconnection,
able and high-quality service, significant innovation, con- and by implementing other regulatory safeguards. In
siderable broadband penetration, and vibrant 1998, competitive facilities-based local exchange carriers
competition. The OECD’s 2002 Review of Regulatory began offering local services in Canada. By 2003, facili-
Reform in Canada finds that ‘‘low prices, good quality ties-based competition from competitive local exchange
service and relatively rapid diffusion of new technologies carriers (CLECs) was particularly intense in urban busi-
characterize the Canadian telecommunications land- ness markets. 18 Entrants such as FCI Broadband, Primus,
scape’’. 14 Indeed, the average prices for business and resi- and 360 Networks are competing aggressively with
22 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
Telus and Bell Canada. CLECs are not expected to make tive to the capital expenditures of the major Canadian
substantial inroads with respect to residential wireline carriers. 
service, in large part because the incumbent local
exchange carriers’ (ILECs) very low prices reflect their
efficiency in providing such service. These prices are so Figure 1: Capital Expenditure Index: Largelow that entrants have difficulty in matching them. Incumbents in the United States and Canada
Although industry experts anticipate that CLECs
will have a somewhat limited role in the provision of
residential telecommunications services, residential con-
sumers are benefiting from growing platform competi-
tion. Canadian telecommunications consumers are dem-
onstrating an increasing willingness to substitute wireless
service for not only secondary, but also primary lines.
Finally, cable operators have begun to offer telephone
service in eastern Canada, and have achieved market
shares of as high as 30 per cent in some local markets.
Canada’s high degree of cable penetration provides a
solid base for the continued deployment of cable
telephony.
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Source: OECD, Draft Communications Outlook 2003,
Chapter 4.The State of Foreign Investment in
Canadian Telecommunications As Figure 1 shows, the capital expenditures of Telus
and Bell Canada remained constant throughout the
Canada’s current regulatory climate is producing piercing of the telecommunications bubble, while invest-
desirable investment results in the telecommunications ment by U.S. ILECs declined significantly.
sector, despite an adverse global investing climate for the
The degree of foreign ownership of Canadian tele-sector. Table 1 demonstrates that Canada increased its
communications carriers is relatively consistent acrossinvestment per capita at a time when investment
both incumbents and new entrants. Tables 2 and 3declined in most other markets.
depict the shares of foreign ownership in Canadian wire-
line and wireless operators, respectively.
Table 1: Change in Telecommunications:
Investment Per Capita, 2000-2001 




1998 1999 2000 2001 2002Canada 22%
BCE 10.5% 6.6% 14.2% 11.1% 14.1%
United Kingdom 0%
Bell Canada 10.5% 25.3% 31.4% 28.9% 14.1%
Australia -14%
TELUS 26.7% 26.7% 30.1% 26.7%
OECD Average -16% AT&T Canada* 33.3% 46.7% 46.7% 46.7%
Germany -17% Call-Net 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0%
Japan -21% GT Group Telecom 25.6% 25.6% 25.0% 25.0%
United States -21% Note: Bell Canada foreign ownership includes any direct
stake in the operating company (for example, within theKorea -38% 20 per cent limit) plus any indirect stake held through BCE
as a holding company. AT&T Canada has been reorganizedSource: OECD, Draft Communications Outlook 2003,
as a Canadian company and renamed ‘‘Allstream’’. AT&TChapter 4.
(the U.S. company) has sold all of its shares in the company.
Similarly, Figure 1 demonstrates that, since 2000, Source: BCE Financial Reports, LYA International, Foreign
the capital expenditures of the major U.S. incumbent Ownership of the Canadian Telecom Industry,
24 (2002).local exchange carriers have declined substantially rela-
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Table 3: Shares of Foreign Ownership in Canadian of motion-picture companies and low-budget game-
Wireless Operators show promoters. 19
More recently, under the new 1996 Telecommuni-
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 cations Act, the FCC has provided CLECs with access to
Bell Mobility 10.5% 25.3% 31.4% 28.9% 14.1% the incumbent carriers’ networks at regulated wholesale
TELUS Mobility 26.7% 26.7% 30.1% 26.7% rates. Facilities-based CLECs are not subject to the same
Rogers AT&T unbundling provisions. The United States also imposes
Wireless 0.0% 16.1% 31.0% 31.1% asymmetric rules on foreign investment in U.S. telecom-
Clearnet 37.5% 34.1% 26.7% N/A munications companies, limiting foreign ownership of
Microcell 25.2% 26.4% 23.3% 26.4% companies with wireless facilities to 25 per cent, but
Notes: Bell Canada foreign ownership includes any direct imposing no such restrictions on companies that only
stake in the operating company (for example, within the have wire-based facilities. In the wireless service industry,
20 per cent limit) plus any indirect stake held through BCE the FCC has provided small companies (classified asas a holding company. Ownership shares are reported at the
‘‘designated entities’’) with bidding credits or specialfirm-wide level, so the shares of Bell Mobility are the same as
access to spectrum auctions — a policy that has resultedthose of BCE and those of TELUS Mobility are the same as
TELUS. in billions of dollars of auction proceeds not being col-
Source: BCE Financial Reports, LYA International, Foreign lected.
Ownership of the Canadian Telecom Industry, 24 The U.S. broadband Internet access market provides(2002).
a final example of asymmetric regulation by the FCC.
Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that Canadian entrants have Due to the nature of U.S. communications laws, the
been as successful as Canadian incumbents in attracting services of cable modem providers are exempt from the
foreign investment. Because there is no noticeable dis- regulations that govern the provision of DSL service —
crepancy in the attractiveness of Canadian telecommuni- despite the fact that cable modems account for about
cations carriers to foreign investors on the basis of two-thirds of all U.S. broadband Internet access sub-
incumbency, Canada should not impose asymmetric scribers. 20
regulations on foreign ownership. In the next section, we
demonstrate how similar attempts to skew the playing
field in favour of entrants have failed in the United Asymmetric Rules for Local Exchange
States. Carriers 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act requires the
FCC to stimulate competition in local exchange servicesIII. The Failure of Asymmetric by creating a privileged class of carriers, known as com-
Regulation of Telecommunications petitive local exchange carriers (CLECs), and to provide
those carriers with preferential access to incumbents’in the United States 
facilities. In this section, we review the associated cost of
he recent experience of the United States illustrates this policy, especially with respect to the misallocation ofT the dangers of asymmetric regulation. Given its geo- resources by the CLECs and the investment community.
graphic proximity and similar socio-economic composi-
tion, the consequences of regulatory action in the United
The Nature of the Asymmetry States are a good predictor for the consequences of sim-
ilar regulatory action in Canada. The United States’s The Telecommunications Act of 1996 directed the
failed foray into asymmetric telecommunications regula- FCC to identify network facilities of ILECs that should
tion highlights the wisdom of the Department of be made available to entrants at regulated wholesale
Industry’s intention to pursue symmetric regulation and rates. 21 The FCC liberally interpreted this mandate by
supplies a potent example of the potential damage to ruling that virtually every element of the ILECs’ net-
Canada’s telecommunications sector from abandoning works — from loops to switches to collocation cages —
that course. be made available at forward-looking, long-run average
In the United States, the Federal Communications incremental costs (LRAIC) to competitors. 22 The scope of
Commission (FCC) has tried repeatedly to inject compe- the unbundled network elements (UNEs) that the FCC
tition into various sectors by establishing rules that apply deemed essential was later found by the courts to be
only to a special class of competitors. In earlier years, for excessive by any reasonable test. 23 According to the FCC,
example, it barred the television networks from having failure to obtain virtually any network element, even
‘‘financial interests’’ in programming so as to promote those supplied by other parties at competitive rates,
the development of new, independent sources of pro- would impair a CLEC’s ability to compete effectively
gramming. It also limited the number of hours of pro- and therefore should be supplied by the incumbents at
gramming that the networks could offer during prime regulated rates. Moreover, because LRAIC rates are based
time to reduce network influence over viewer choices. on the costs that a perfectly efficient network would
Both initiatives were failures, redounding to the benefit incur, the FCC determined that LRAIC rates should be
24 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
less than the actual historical costs of building and main- than $80 billion in market capitalization and reported
taining the ILECs’ networks. more than $65 billion of spending on capital facilities
between 1996 and 2001. 27 Now those CLECs have aThe FCC’s unbundling rules have undergone peri-
scant $4 billion in total market capitalization. 28 As wasodic reviews and court reversals, but they remain in
the case in the U.S. airlines and trucking industries twoplace. 24 These rules are asymmetric in the sense that
decades ago, a large number of new entrants have foun-facilities-based CLECs and cable telephony operators
dered on bad business plans and a disappointing market.that offer services identical to those provided by a given
The failure of the CLECs was magnified because of theILEC are not subject to the same unbundling require-
subsidies that lured so many new carriers into the mar-ments. The reasoning behind this asymmetry is that the
ketplace, a feature lacking in the earlier exercises of air-imposition of unbundling on facilities-based entrants
line and trucking deregulation.would have the undesirable result of deterring an
entrant from investing in its own network. The FCC’s unbundling rules discouraged CLECs
from investing in their own facilities. A CLEC will forgoThe intended beneficiaries of the unbundling
facilities-based investments so long as it has other oppor-regime were presumably consumers who, in theory,
tunities that have higher net present value (NPV). Artifi-would pay rates for telecommunications services that
cially low UNE prices induce CLECs to defer facilities-approximated the average cost of providing those ser-
based investments because the NPV of UNE leasing isvices. As it turns out, the beneficiaries of the plan were
higher than the NPV of investing in on-net assets. Insome CLEC investors. In particular, CLECs accepted the
addition, because a CLEC can pick and choose from thediscounts and charged consumers prices that were just
incumbents’ successful sunk investments, it pays for thebelow the end-user price charged by the incumbents.
CLEC to ‘‘wait and see’’ how well other investments inWith the most admirable intentions, the FCC created
that sector have performed before committing itself tolittle more than an arbitrage opportunity for knowledge-
investing its own capital. 29able investors who enjoyed influence in Washington.
In a paper co-authored with Dr. Allan Ingraham, we
The Cost of the Asymmetry found that the mis-pricing of UNE elements by the state
Despite access to a larger capital market, new public utility commission (at the FCC’s direction) dis-
entrants in the United States have not created a market couraged hundreds of millions of dollars from facilities-
that is likely to be more competitive in the long term based investment. 30 By examining the variation in facili-
than that existing in Canada. Competition in local ties-based investment in loops across U.S. states and
exchange services is settling into platform competition across states over time, we found that an increase in the
between incumbent carriers, cable companies that offer UNE loop rate increases CLEC facilities-based lines for
voice telephony, and wireless providers. Most of the any reasonable own-price elasticity of demand for CLEC
entrants that relied on unbundling have failed. Only a service. We also found that facilities-based lines growth
handful of the new local carriers are likely to survive, relative to UNE growth was faster in states where the
particularly the facilities-based sellers of special access in cost of UNEs was higher relative to the cost of facilities-
large metropolitan areas. Two large long distance compa- based investment. Hence, the best argument for main-
nies, AT&T and MCI-WorldCom, are also attempting to taining the current unbundling regime — namely, that
compete as resellers in this market. low UNE rates encourage CLECs to rent at first, and
then build facilities once they have some market experi-The FCC’s attempt to induce competition artifi-
ence — is not supported by the data.cially by creating a wholesale market in network facilities
with prices below actual costs has resulted in an enor- Because unbundling discouraged facilities-based
mous waste of resources. The subsidized access of new investment and the CLECs who availed themselves of
CLECs to their larger, incumbent rivals’ facilities mis-priced UNEs did not leverage their customers into
enhanced their access to capital in the United States stand-alone networks, the FCC’s attempt to ‘‘unlevel’’ the
from 1996 to 2001. The capital-spending boom is now playing field has been a notable failure. Such a lack of
widely acknowledged to have created excess capacity in success by the U.S. entrants should serve as a warning to
data and voice transmission, 25 but the rise in investment Industry Canada that asymmetric regulation is unlikely
spread far beyond fibre-optic transmission facilities. Cap- to create an ‘‘ideal’’ number of competitors for Canada’s
ital spending by the new local carriers increased from telecommunications market. As of April 2003, two of
virtually nothing to nearly $20 billion in 2000 alone. 26 Canada’s five national network providers were reorga-
Unfortunately, these new entrants did not develop nizing under bankruptcy protection and would emerge
new services, and now the survivors are primarily sub- from such protection over the next few months. These
sisting by reselling incumbent services — that is, by bankruptcies suggest that Canada could suffer in the
offering the local service delivered by the incumbents near future from some of the same problems of excess
through the so-called ‘‘UNE platform’’. Very few of the capacity that plague the United States. The economies of
survivors are likely to remain in the long term. The scale and scope in telecommunications push the
publicly-traded CLECs were once the repository of more industry towards a handful of suppliers, including cable
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companies, telephone companies, and wireless providers. transactions needed to acquire capital, technical exper-
These companies compete vigorously with each other tise, and technological upgrades from foreign investors.
and will compete more vigorously in the future. Industry For example, Rupert Murdoch, the chairman of Fox Tel-
Canada should not induce a larger number of suppliers evision Network, faced such great expense in complying
than the demand for telecommunications services is with the strict limitations when building his network
capable of sustaining. It is better to leave these funda- that he decided to become a U.S. citizen so as to reduce
mental choices to the market. the regulatory burden. 41 The funds expended on compli-
ance with this regulation could have been directed to
further upgrades in programming or the delivery of theAsymmetric Rules for Foreign Carriers 
product to U.S. consumers or both. 42 A foreign investorAnother form of asymmetric regulation in the who sought to build or acquire a wireline telecommuni-United States involves the FCC’s authority to deny (or cations network, by contrast, would not incur those legalrevoke) a wireless license to a corporation with indirect and regulatory expenses. Hence, the asymmetry likelyforeign ownership exceeding 25 per cent31 if the FCC distorts investment decisions of foreign carriers betweendetermines that such ownership is not in the public wireless and wireline acquisition targets.interest. 32 This limitation on foreign investment imposes
The FCC’s discretion in waiving the ownershipsignificant costs on the industry and on American con-
restrictions creates additional costs by injecting uncer-sumers.
tainty into investment decisions and driving away risk-
averse investors. Moreover, the conditioning of U.S.The Nature of the Asymmetry 
licenses on tests of the ‘‘public interest, convenience and
Section 310(b) of the U.S. Communications Act of necessity’’ remains controversial in international trade
1934 grants the FCC discretionary authority to limit negotiations. 43 The FCC has been able to delay granting
foreign ownership of certain wireless communications licenses in response to political pressures, and has inter-
licenses to 25 per cent. 33 The rules are asymmetric preted its powers broadly as a right to extract ex ante
because carriers without radio-spectrum licenses, such as concessions from foreign applicants before granting
pure wireline carriers, are not subject to the foreign own- licenses.
ership restrictions. 34 Although the disparate treatment of
wireline and wireless carriers may have been innocuous
at one time, the divisions between those services are Asymmetric Rules for Carriers Bidding in
beginning to blur as consumers are increasingly substi- Spectrum Auctions 
tuting wireless telephones for landline connections. 35 As The FCC has also attempted to induce competition
wireless and wireline carriers compete in an increasingly in wireless services by creating a privileged class of car-
direct fashion, restrictions on wireless licensees will dis- riers, known as designated entities (DEs). These entities
tort investment decisions of foreign investors across U.S. have been given preferential treatment in spectrum auc-
telecommunications carriers. 36 tions, a policy that has created confusion and led to a
Another asymmetry arises from the fact that the lengthy court battle. This policy has not improved wire-
FCC has interpreted the statutory language of sec- less competition in the United States, but it has cost the
tion 310(b)(3) to mean that it has broad discretion in U.S. Treasury billions of dollars of lost auction revenues.
determining what is in the public interest. 37 In fulfilling
that obligation, the FCC considers the following factors:
The Nature of the Asymmetry ‘‘the extent of the foreign ownership or control of the
corporation; the passive nature of the licensed facility; Congress instructed the FCC to seek ways to
and whether the applicant was otherwise qualified’’. 38 If achieve diversity in the ownership of spectrum licenses. 44
a foreign government has an ownership interest in the With the best intentions, the FCC implemented several
foreign investor, the acquiring firm must be reviewed complex auction systems that were exploited by sophisti-
under the international settlements policy (ISP) ‘‘to pre- cated companies in FCC Auction #5, which began in
vent whipsawing by a foreign monopoly carrier’’. 39 December 1995. First, the FCC set aside large swaths of
Finally, the FCC looks at the economic relationship spectrum for DEs — that is, for carriers believed to be
between the United States and the foreign state. 40 If the too small to compete for this spectrum.45 The FCC also
country allows foreigners access to its market, the FCC is provided the DEs with bidding credits in these auctions,
more likely to determine that the license transfer is in which allowed them to purchase licenses at a fraction of
the public interest. The inclusion of these inherently the cost that non-DEs were willing to pay. Finally, the
subjective factors makes the regulation even more asym- FCC offered generous financing plans to DEs that ena-
metric in its application. bled them to defer payments on winning bids for up to
10 years.
The Cost of the Asymmetry Nextwave, a small company created for the purpose
The effect of these foreign restrictions in the United of bidding on the set-aside spectrum, was one of the first
States is evident in the complex and expensive corporate firms to take advantage of the FCC’s new program.
26 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
Nextwave had a total of $4.2 billion in winning bids at encouraged to disguise themselves as small firms to win
the conclusion of Auction #5. 46 Even though the win- valuable discounts. In a study of the price effects of the
ning bidders were allowed to defer their payments on set-aside program in Auction #35, Professor Peter
this spectrum over 10 years (and such DEs were obli- Cramton of the University of Maryland, Dr. Allan
gated to make only interest payments for the first six Ingraham, and one of the authors of this report found
years), 47 Nextwave failed to make its scheduled pay- that, had Alaska Native pursued its objectives in the
ments on its licenses and entered bankruptcy. In open auction, Alaska Native would have won fewer
response, the FCC reclaimed the licenses and re-auc- licenses and would have paid significantly more for
tioned them in 2000. those licenses that it won.53 Hence, the FCC’s set-aside
system potentially cost the government substantial reve-The FCC again reserved certain portions of the
nues in the non-set-aside auction.spectrum for ‘‘entrepreneurial’’ firms in a December
2000 re-auction of the Nextwave spectrum, Auction #35. Although wireless consumers do not care about the
In particular, the FCC prevented the participation of any financial might of their wireless operator, they do value
firm in the set-aside portion of the auction that was the quality of service, range of wireless options, and price.
‘‘controlled’’ by a firm with assets in excess of $500 mil- If set-aside policies succeed in placing spectrum in the
lion or annual revenues in excess of $125 million. This hands of small, inexperienced owners, such as Nextwave,
control standard was intended once again to promote they do little to contribute to the quality of wireless
diversity among wireless carriers and to increase compe- service, which can only be efficiently offered by large
tition after the auction, while allowing small carriers to national carriers. Eventually, the winning bidders in a
gain improved access to investment capital from larger ‘‘set-aside’’ auction must either sell their spectrum to
telecommunications firms. Certain large carriers, how- these experienced national carriers or contract with the
ever, evaded this control standard and gained access to national carriers to provide the wireless service. 54 In the
the set-aside spectrum by creating companies that were case of Nextwave, however, the asymmetric bidding
(for all practical purposes) under their control. policy not only failed to achieve its stated objectives, but
also deprived consumers of the competition that wouldFor example, AT&T Wireless, a firm with assets of
have resulted from the productive use of the spectrum$43.0 billion (86 times the FCC’s limit) and operating
that Nextwave obtained in the auction.revenues of $6.6 billion (53 times the FCC’s limit) in the
summer before the auction began, 48 gained access to the
closed auction through the creation of a company called Asymmetric Rules for Broadband Service‘‘Alaska Native’’. 49 According to Alaska Native’s bidding Providers application filed at the FCC in November 2000, AT&T
U.S. regulatory policy has also created an unlevelWireless owned 38.2 per cent of the equity of Alaska
playing field in the broadband Internet access market.Native plus debt that was convertible to another 41.2 per
Despite the fact that cable modem providers account forcent of the company’s equity. 50 Alaska Native was the
three-quarters of all residential broadband customers indominant bidder in the set-aside auction. It won approx-
the United States, the FCC continues to regulate DSLimately 36 per cent of the set-aside licenses on a popula-
providers as if they were dominant carriers under thetion-weighted basis, and approximately 50 per cent of
Telecommunications Act.the set-aside licenses on a value-weighted basis. 51
Nextwave sued the FCC for violating the bank-
ruptcy laws in response to the Commission’s re-auction The Nature of the Asymmetry 
of its spectrum, but the Supreme Court decided in Jan-
The United States regulates DSL services provideduary 2003 that the FCC did not have the authority to
by incumbent telephone carriers under the provisions ofsupersede the Bankruptcy Court in its role as creditor to
the 1996 Telecommunications Act that governNextwave. 52 As a result of the court challenge, the FCC
unbundling and interconnection. Cable modem services,was forced to negate its 2000 re-auction of the spectrum
on the other hand, are subject to considerably less regu-that Nextwave claimed. Thus, for more than six years
lation because they were developed by companies that(1996 through 2003), a significant share (30 MHz of
are regulated under different provisions of the U.S. Com-170 MHz of cellular and PCS licenses) of the total spec-
munications Act. 55 The regulations imposed upontrum available to U.S. wireless carriers went unused in
incumbent telephone companies have restricted theirsome geographic areas, and the U.S. Treasury was unable
ability to compete in the broadband market with theto collect Nextwave’s winning bids.
unregulated cable companies. 56
The FCC’s treatment of the Regional Bell Compa-
The Cost of the Asymmetry nies (RBOCs), the major providers of DSL service, is
The FCC’s asymmetric treatment of wireless carriers discriminatory in a number of ways. First, the RBOCs
distorts investment decisions of both incumbent carriers have been excluded from the core backbone market
and new entrants. Large wireless carriers that would oth- until recently due to the line-of-business restrictions in
erwise have paid full price for spectrum have been the 1982 AT&T antitrust decree and similar restrictions
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that were carried over into the 1996 Telecommunica- IV. Economic Considerations in the
tions Act. 57 Second, the RBOCs are not permitted to Canadian Foreign Ownership
manufacture equipment used on customer premises. 58 Debate Therefore, unlike cable providers such as AT&T (now
Comcast), the RBOCs cannot collaborate with equip- he asymmetric rules designed by U.S. regulators to
ment vendors. Third, the Telecommunications Act T encourage investment by new local entrants have
requires RBOCs to unbundle their network facilities59 at resulted in a large amount of wasteful investment.
rates that have so far been based on the forward-looking Although these asymmetric rules helped to increase the
costs of providing them.60 Furthermore, the FCC has annual growth rate in capital spending between 1995
extended unbundling requirements to high-speed and 2001 from five per cent per year to 20 per cent per
Internet services and has compelled the RBOCs to year, capital spending has since collapsed to less than its
unbundle the ‘‘spectrum’’ within existing local loops — a 1995 level. Competition in telecommunications is set-
regulation that is now being vacated. Fifth, until recently, tling into platform competition among incumbent car-
RBOCs were barred from providing interLATA (local riers, perhaps one or two ‘‘long distance’’ companies,
access and transport area) services, 61 which prevented cable companies, wireless providers, and satellite compa-
them from creating ‘‘regional centered points of presence nies.
that would allow them to take advantage of economies
The lessons from two other examples of asymmetricof scale in data service.’’ 62
regulation in the United States are also relevant to the
These diverse forms of regulation of the RBOCs do issues raised by Industry Canada. In particular, the U.S.
not apply to cable providers’ offerings of cable modem experience with broadband regulation and foreign own-
service. As a result of this asymmetry, competition ership restrictions on wireless carriers suggests that there
between incumbent telephone providers and cable com- is a very real danger that Industry Canada’s two pro-
panies in the broadband Internet access market is not as posals, tiering and licensing, will provide disincentives
effective as it could otherwise be. for investment in Canadian infrastructure.
The Cost of the Asymmetry A Tiering Approach for Foreign
Investment Restrictions As of June 2003, the RBOCs’ share of the residential
and small business broadband Internet access market Establishing ‘‘tiers’’ of Canadian carriers eligible to
was roughly 30 per cent — slightly more than half of attract foreign capital would not be in the public interest.
AT&T’s share of the U.S. interstate long distance market If we assume that foreign-capital restrictions raise the
when the FCC declared AT&T to be non-dominant. 63 relative cost of capital for Canadian carriers, imposing
Incumbent telephone companies, by contrast, are still such restrictions on incumbents would decrease their
unable to reach as many subscribers with DSL as cable incentive to invest in network upgrades or new services.
companies can reach with cable modem services. This This asymmetry would tilt the market towards the car-
imbalance is not surprising. Because cable companies do riers eligible for foreign capital infusions even if those
not have to provide entrants with access to their facilities, carriers were less efficient or less able to invest and
they have a much stronger incentive to invest in the develop new services and facilities. In addition, such
system upgrades needed to deliver broadband service. restrictions might cause difficulty for Canada under its
The incumbent telephone companies have been much trade agreements with other countries.
less willing to invest the necessary capital to extend fibre
and electronics out into their networks so that they can
provide DSL service. Their reluctance is understandable Tiering Would Reduce the Incentives of
given the asymmetric regulatory requirements that they Incumbent Carriers to Invest in Network
share much of these improved facilities with rivals at Upgrades or New Services 
cost-based rates. We begin by assuming that allowing all Canadian
DSL providers would be able to compete more carriers unfettered access to foreign capital would reduce
effectively against cable modem providers if the FCC their cost of capital. If this assumption were not true,
were to free the RBOCs from the requirement to lease there would appear to be little reason to address the
their new broadband facilities to competitors at regu- foreign-capital restriction at this time. Any attempt to
lated, cost-based rates. The beneficiaries of such a move allow a favoured class of Canadian carriers access to for-
would be consumers, who would likely experience lower eign capital while denying the incumbents comparable
prices for broadband connections. Moreover, consumers access would result in diminished investment incentives
who are not yet able to receive DSL service would expe- for the incumbents. Denying incumbents access to for-
rience greater choice if RBOCs were assured that their eign capital would raise their cost of capital relative to
incremental investment to upgrade the copper loops in that of their rivals. This discrepancy in the cost of capital
these areas would not be appropriated by rivals. would place incumbent carriers at a competitive disad-
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vantage vis-à-vis entrants. The lower cost of capital would ciently than U.S. firms have used the FCC’s favourable
allow entrants to take greater risks on new technologies rules.
and would enable them to price their services at lower
costs. In an integrated global economy, the supply of
Objective Measures To Establish Restrictedcapital for telecommunications is likely to be relatively
Companies is Difficult elastic. 64 It is not surprising, therefore, that the imposi-
tion of barriers to foreign ownership by other nations Assuming that Industry Canada were to pursue
has resulted in large reductions in foreign investment. 65 asymmetric regulations, it would be very difficult to pro-
If shareholders perceived that the restricted companies vide an objective standard for determining which car-
were at a competitive disadvantage, tiering could lower riers should be relieved of foreign ownership restrictions
the restricted companies share prices, and therefore, actu- and which ones should remain subject to them. The
ally increase their cost of capital. criteria for restricting investment in a company could be
based on objective measures, such as financial
benchmarks or market share, or purely subjective factors.
Tiering Could Aggravate the Problem of Excess
The investment criteria could be based on the typeCapacity 
of platform, as is the case in the United States where
Another problem with tiering is that it would dis- wireline carriers are not subject to the foreign capital
tort the investment decisions of foreign carriers looking restriction imposed on wireless carriers. However, as
to invest in Canada. Foreign investment that would oth- alternative platforms are increasingly competing in the
erwise go to an incumbent would now be steered to an same product market — namely, voice and data services
entrant. This additional investment could lead to — it is not reasonable to give an artificial advantage to
wasteful infrastructure investments, as occurred in the one platform over another.
United States in the late 1990s. If excessive new capacity
Finally, large Canadian carriers might create sepa-were built, as in the United States, the value of existing
rate subsidiaries to perform research and product devel-networks would decline. To fill excess capacity from the
opment or to offer new services. Would these subsidi-telecommunications networks, carriers would be forced
aries be eligible for foreign capital infusions? If theto cut prices, precipitating exit from the industry.
subsidiaries were considered to be under the control of
For an historical analogy, Industry Canada should the restricted carrier, then these firms might move all
consider the period of 2000–2002 in the U.S. telecom- research and product development activities outside of
munications industry. After recognizing the extent of Canada where the restrictions would not apply. To
excess capacity in long distance networks, created in part understand how far a carrier might go to avoid these
by the easy access to capital for fibre-optic networks and rules (or game the system), Industry Canada should
the asymmetrical ban of RBOC participation in this review the U.S. experiment in creating designated enti-
market, the market value of these long-distance carriers ties for wireless services. 68
declined severely. Broadwing, Global Crossing, ICG,
Level 3, McLeod, Touch America, WorldCom, XO Com-
munications and several other notable long distance, Tiering Would Not Add to the Competitive
fibre-optic network operators greatly scaled back their Process 
operations or filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy during As discussed above, there is a trend in U.S. telecom-
this period. munications toward platform competition between
As we discussed in an earlier section, asymmetric incumbent carriers, perhaps one or two ‘‘long distance’’
rules designed to encourage investment by U.S. CLECs companies, cable companies, wireless providers, and sat-
also contributed to the inefficient investment of roughly ellite companies. A small number of new facilities-based
$40 billion between 1996 and 2001. 66 Between 1987 local carriers add marginally to this competition. Entry
and 1996, nominal and real (inflation-adjusted) capital promotes consumers’ welfare only to the extent that new
spending by telecommunications carriers increased at carriers can discipline the incumbents’ prices, stimulate
average rates of 4.8 and 4.5 per cent per year, respectively. the incumbents to upgrade their offerings, or provide
After the asymmetric rules were imposed, the growth new and innovative services themselves. In the United
rate over the next four years soared to more than 20 per States, the new carriers have not been successful in any
cent annually. The asymmetric rules in the United States of these respects. To the extent that incumbents are
helped to accelerate capital spending by roughly 15 per lowering prices (DSL prices are falling) and offering new
cent by encouraging the entry of scores of new entrants, services (3G wireless services), it would appear that they
many of which lacked sound business plans. Were a are reacting to the competitive offerings of facilities-
similar acceleration to occur in Canada with the same based wireline carriers and other operators using alterna-
results, $1.155 billion per year (equal to 15 per cent of tive platforms, rather than to the derivative offerings of
the $7.7 billion in capital spending in 2001) could be small, financially-troubled entrants. Moreover, those
wasted. 67 There is no reason to believe that Canadian entrants have not been successful in introducing new
entrants would use their favourable status any more effi- services.
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A Licensing Approach for Foreign Asymmetric Regulation of Foreign
Investment Restrictions Investment in Australia and Korea 
Industry Canada is also considering whether foreign Asymmetric regulation of foreign investment has
investment restrictions should be replaced with a proven to be ineffective in Australia and Korea. In Aus-
licensing approach. Currently, only providers of interna- tralia, the government maintains a 35 per cent foreign
tional telecommunications services are licensed. Under ownership limitation in Telstra, the incumbent provider,
the new approach, there would be no ownership restric- but it allows foreign ownership of 100 per cent in other
tions, but mergers and acquisitions would be examined facilities-based carriers. 71 In 1997, the Korean govern-
on a case-by-case basis. ment maintained a 20 per cent foreign ownership limita-
tion for Korean Telecom (KT), the incumbent provider,A licensing regime would risk creating new uncer-
but raised the foreign ownership limit to 33 per cent fortainty for operators by subjecting them to new or
other facilities-based carriers. 72 In 1998, the Korean gov-changed conditions at the discretion of the regulator. In
ernment raised the foreign ownership for KT to 33 peraddition, the creation of new public policy burdens
cent, 73 thus ending the asymmetry for a short period ofcould reduce access to capital and increase the cost of
time until July 1999, when the government relaxed thecapital for the whole industry. For example, a new
foreign ownership restrictions on other facilities-basedlicensing condition might require a head office in
carriers to 49 per cent. 74 Finally, in August 2002, theCanada, the investment of a certain amount each year in
government raised the limit for KT to 49 per cent, elimi-rural broadband deployment, or other service require-
nating the asymmetry once again. 75ments. As such, it could have a chilling effect on invest-
ment in the industry that would outweigh any benefits Financial data suggest that the asymmetric regula-associated with the liberalization of the current owner- tion of foreign ownership in Korea harmed shareholdersship rules. Moreover, a licensing approach would inject a of the incumbent carrier. When KT announced its cam-political element into the investment calculus that might paign to raise the foreign ownership ceiling to 49 perfurther retard foreign investment. cent, its share price increased 10 per cent. 76 Analysts
stated that KT’s valuation had suffered because of the
Licensing Would Reduce Foreign Investment imbalance between supply and demand of foreign cap-
ital. 77 They reasoned that with the foreign ownershipThe uncertainty created by a more discretionary
ceiling raised, potential demand from foreign investorsadministrative process could have a negative impact on
would increase KT’s share price. 78capital investment from both Canadian and foreign
sources. In particular, foreign investors would likely be Extending asymmetric regulatory advantages to aless willing to invest in an environment in which the particular class of competitors is not likely to alter theconditions for obtaining licenses is discretionary and long-term equilibrium market structure if these compa-therefore subject to political considerations. 69 For most nies are not viable for a variety of economic reasons. Ainternational carriers, the size of the U.S. telecommunica- few large players dominate the telecommunicationstions market makes it sufficiently attractive to overcome market in Australia and Korea — despite the favourableregulatory impediments. Given Canada’s much smaller investment treatment bestowed on non-incumbent car-market and the global competition for investment, for- riers. 79 In Australia, there are two large wireline providerseign investors are less likely to look to Canada if they (Telstra and Optus) and three major wireless providersbelieve there is any possibility their investment will be (Telstra, Optus, and Vodafone). Competition has devel-subject to delay or special conditions as a result of a oped slowly in the local services market; Telstra controlslicensing regime. 95 per cent of the local fixed services market. Further-
more, Australia’s broadband penetration rate of 1.5 per
Licensing Would Subject Foreign Carriers to cent trails most industrialized nations. 80
Political Pressures 
In Korea, the story is much the same. There are fourA licensing regime essentially constitutes a case-by- large wireline providers (Korean Telecom, Hanaro,case evaluation of each entity and its foreign investment Dacom, and Onse) and three wireless providers (KTtransactions. Such a process inefficiently imposes compli- FreeTel, SK Telecom, and LG Telecom). 81 Althoughance costs on carriers and introduces the possibility of an Korea is among the world’s leaders in broadband pene-asymmetric application of rules from one company to tration (an accomplishment not owing to any foreignanother over time. The potential for such a process to be ownership policy), Korean Telecom still controls 95 peroverly politicized would be significant, particularly if cent of the local fixed service market.larger Canadian companies were involved in transac-
tions. There is a strong possibility that the overall The factors that influence long run market structure
licensing and approval process would be highly subjec- — economies of scale and scope, demographics, and
tive and opaque, which would ultimately damage the market technologies — are likely to be much more
overall investment climate for Canadian telecommunica- important than differential access to foreign capital in
tions. 70 relatively large, wealthy countries. The persistent failure
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of policies in other countries that target certain classes of choose the politically desirable path and often fail to
competitors should serve as a warning to Canada as it satisfy either objective. Moreover, carriers waste vast
contemplates making foreign capital available only to resources to convince the regulator that they are in fact
new entrants. Despite attempts to encourage competi- complying with its objectives.
tion through tiering, the market structure of telecommu-
Industry Canada should not attempt to bestow pref-nications in Australia and Korea has not changed signifi-
erential treatment on particular firms or particular plat-cantly since asymmetric regulation was imposed.
forms. Wireless systems should not be promoted over
satellite delivery. Cable telephony should not be pro-
moted over fibre or copper delivery. Small wireline com-V. Conclusion 
petitors should not be given capital-cost advantages over
y conferring an advantage on one carrier over their larger rivals. Giving one platform technology or oneB another, a regulator believes that it can direct set of firms an artificial advantage is likely to distort the
resources to more efficient deployment than can the free allocation of market resources if it succeeds, and to be
market. Even in the rare case of market failure or a even more wasteful of society’s scarce resources if it does
perceived lack of competition (which has not been estab- not. In either case, the result is adverse to the interests of
lished in Canada’s case), asymmetric regulation intended Canadian consumers. Unless there is strong evidence of
to confer an advantage on a privileged class of carriers is market failure, Industry Canada should trust the
likely to do more harm than good. Skewing the regula- market’s choices. If Industry Canada has any reservations
tory environment distorts the carriers’ choices — rather about exercising such restraint, it can simply look to the
than maximizing their private interests, the carriers failed experiences of its neighbour to the south.
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